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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      FCS Advisors, LLC,
                     Plaintiff,
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                                                21 Civ. 6995 (PKC)
                 V.
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      THEIA GROUP, ET AL.,
                                                Conference
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                     Defendants.
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 9
                                                New York, N.Y.
                                                November 19, 2024
                                                10:45 a.m.
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      Before:
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                            HON. P. KEVIN CASTEL,
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
15
      STEPTOE, LLP
           Attorneys for Plaintiff
16
      BY: CHARLES ANTHONY MICHAEL
17
      FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP
           Attorneys for Basler Turbo Conversions, L.L.C.
18
      BY: ANNE BERKOWITZ SEKEL
           -AND-
19
      REINHART BOENER VAN DEUREN S.C.
           Attorneys for Basler Turbo Conversions, L.L.C.
20
           PAUL J. STOCKHAUSEN (via telephone)
21
      BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
           Attorneys for CogniSphere, LLC
22
      BY: MATTHEW LANE SCHWARTZ
           LINDSEY RUFF
23
      Also Present:
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      Robert Leeds
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Carlisle group, correct?

THE COURT: Please be seated. 1 2 (Case called) 3 THE COURT: There's no plaintiff. That's part of the problem here. There is no plaintiff. There is no defendant. 4 5 There's a Mr. Schwartz however. MR. SCHWARTZ: Good morning, your Honor. Matthew 6 7 Schwartz and Lindsey Ruff for CogniSphere, and we're joined by 8 our client. 9 MS. SEKEL: Good afternoon, your Honor. Anne Sekel on 10 behalf of interested party Basler, and on the telephone, my 11 colleague Paul Stockhausen, for the Reinhart firm, also on the 12 side of Basler. 13 THE COURT: I take it the receiver did not bother to 14 appear today? They are not interested in any of this? 15 MR. SCHWARTZ: They are not interested in the sense that they are not parties to this dispute. We did reach out to 16 17 them. Mr. Fuqua was not able to be here on short notice. We 18 did receive a declaration from the receiver in support of the 19 motion, so he certainly has a position. 20 THE COURT: Let me find out. 21 MR. SCHWARTZ: We're joined by counsel for FCS as 22 well. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So FCS is appearing. So that's the

MR. MICHAEL: No, your Honor, brevet.

OBJRFASc THE COURT: 1 What? MR. SCHWARTZ: FCS is affiliated with Brevet. 2 3 THE COURT: Reve? 4 MR. MICHAEL: No. Brevet. 5 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Brevet. And let me ask you: Is Brevet associated with LTS? 6 7 MR. MICHAEL: Yes. THE COURT: Because we've traveled down this road 8 9 before. This is bringing up some recollections. 10 MR. MICHAEL: Understood. 11 THE COURT: And what is the relationship, if any, 12 between Brevet and CogniSphere? 13 MR. MICHAEL: There is none. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. So let me see 15 whether I understand this. CogniSphere received an assignment of a contract from LTS; is that correct? 16 17 MR. SCHWARTZ: Succeeded to its rights under the 18 contract, correct. It was originally a subsidiary of LTS where 19 the contractual rights were placed, and then it was spun off 20 out of LTS to an entity owned by Mr. Leeds. 21 THE COURT: And Mr. Leeds was previously associated 22 with Brevet; is that the situation? Or a Brevet company?

THE COURT: And Mr. Leeds was previously associated with Brevet; is that the situation? Or a Brevet company?

MR. SCHWARTZ: So Mr. Leeds has been, at various times, an outside adviser to Brevet, as well as an outside adviser to Theia. This has all been disclosed and discussed,

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and I think we've been careful to note this in our papers.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. So what happens here is at some point in time before the receivership, Theia enters into a contract with Basler.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct.

THE COURT: Then we have a receivership, which is secured by an affiliate of Brevet, or Brevet—however you want to pronounce it—and the receiver, who is paid and funded by Brevet, then recommends to the Court that the assets be sold to an affiliate of Brevet and that sale is approved. That's to LTS. And your client, CogniSphere, has succeeded to the rights of LTS in this will contract with Basler.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct. And only with respect to this contract. Not with respect to the other --

THE COURT: Not with respect to the other?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Theia assets.

THE COURT: What is the word?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Theia, the company put into receivership.

THE COURT: Oh, Theia's assets, not other assets. This is just one asset.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So how are you in a position any different than someone who acquires the rights to a Ricoh copier owned by Theia and comes into my court seeking to

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enforce the warranty against Ricoh? How are you any different?

MR. SCHWARTZ: The difference is we're not seeking to enforce the warranty on the copiers. I think we were very careful in our papers to say that. We're not asserting a breach of contract. That's not before your Honor. We understand that's not before your Honor. We raised this originally because Basler obtained an order from the Court to approve a new agreement with the receiver; a new agreement that paid them potentially additional consideration that they were not otherwise entitled to, and they obtained that order based on representations, representations made to the receiver and to the district court in a sworn declaration.

THE COURT: When was this order entered?

MR. SCHWARTZ: June 11.

THE COURT: If you're referring to the June 11 order, how do you get off asserting that Basler obtained this order? That order was presented to me on behalf of LTS, the receiver, and Basler. And now you characterize it as an order obtained by Basler. How do you get to that?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Because the impetus for the order was that it resolved a motion filed by Basler. So they had filed a motion against --

THE COURT: I am aware of that. That preceded it.

MR. SCHWARTZ: It did.

THE COURT: But you all presented it.

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MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, not us. We were not involved at that time.

THE COURT: LTS did. Your predecessor in interest in whose shoes you claim to stand, correct?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes. But what we did not understand at the time was that the representation that had been made by Basler was false.

THE COURT: Well, you didn't have any understanding because you were a stranger at that point.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct. And that's why -
THE COURT: Your client was a stranger.

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's why we put in evidence from the

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's why we put in evidence from the receiver. We put in evidence from others. Everyone understood the representation to mean -- because this is exactly what it said, these planes are ready for delivery, which means they are airworthy.

THE COURT: But let's get this straight. It's not your client who is misled, correct?

MR. SCHWARTZ: My client was not a proponent of that motion, but he certainly was involved in the discussions at the time.

THE COURT: CogniSphere?

MR. SCHWARTZ: CogniSphere.

THE COURT: Not disclosed to the Court, of course.

MR. SCHWARTZ: That there was someone else talking to

the parties, that's right.

THE COURT: Right?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, true.

THE COURT: Okay. So your client is not in a position to say it was lied to?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Which is why the way we have styled this application -- again, we tried to raise this in the most benign way possible. We wrote a letter as soon as we found out on July 1. We said, Hey, we found this out. Maybe it won't be an issue because they tell us the certifications are coming right away, but we just want to put a marker down. And we got no response even though your Honor ordered them to respond.

THE COURT: Well, they had responded before my order, hadn't they?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, only to say they gave the-my-cousin-Vinny response; everything this guy said was nonsense. They didn't explain why it was wrong in their view. It was not until we got an opposition to a full-blown motion that we get for the very first time a different theory of what that representation meant and that this experimental-type certification qualified under the contract when no one thought --

THE COURT: Let me ask you: The contract which you're referring to, the contract with Theia --

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.

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THE COURT: -- is that an exhibit to the June 11 1 2 order? 3 MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't believe so. I believe you 4 have -- the letter agreement was an exhibit to the order, and 5 the letter agreement incorporated the APA, which in turn 6 incorporated that agreement, but it was not itself attached to 7 the order. I agree. 8 THE COURT: So you are not going to ask me to construe 9 that agreement? 10 MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm simply asking you to --THE COURT: No. Am I right about that? You are not 11 12 here asking the Court to construe or enforce the original 13 agreement between Theia and Basler? 14 MR. SCHWARTZ: Not in that posture. I'm asking to 15 look at the representation that was made to the Court. 16 THE COURT: All right. And which representation? 17 MR. SCHWARTZ: It was the representation that Basler 18 had fully performed its contractual obligations and was 19 prepared to deliver. 20 THE COURT: And if that's not true, why isn't your 21 remedy to go to the designated forum in the contract between 22 Theia and Basler? 23 MR. SCHWARTZ: Because we're not only aggrieved by a 24 violation of the original contract. Again, the letter

agreement that was approved in the June 11 order provided for

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additional and different consideration. And so, what we, you know, the nub of what we're asking for here is our client paid several million dollars more than they otherwise should have.

THE COURT: Why shouldn't I just vacate, if you were misled -- first of all, you didn't enter into the stipulation and order. But if you persuade me that someone was misled into entering into it, maybe the receiver was misled even though the receiver is not here to claim that.

MR. SCHWARTZ: But, again, we have a declaration from the receiver.

THE COURT: That's great, but my recollection is there were a lot of lawyers who were working on the receivership estate.

MR. SCHWARTZ: True.

THE COURT: And they certainly know how to come into this courtroom when they feel like it, particularly to make a fee application.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I understand that.

THE COURT: They apparently didn't feel like it.

MR. SCHWARTZ: All I can tell you is that we communicated with the receiver directly in his capacity as a witness essentially, and he was not available on such short notice to be here.

THE COURT: The receiver himself.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The receiver. I did not speak to his

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1 lawyers. 2 THE COURT: What about his phalanx of lawyers? 3 MR. SCHWARTZ: By --4 THE COURT: You don't know. All right. If you were 5 lied to, then my feeling is I should vacate this June 11, 2024, stipulation and order, and send you off and pursue your 6 7 remedies under the contract. 8 MR. SCHWARTZ: Right, and one of -- I mean, the 9 alternative relief we asked for is to unwind the contract and 10 letter agreement. 11 THE COURT: No, I didn't say unwind the contracts and 12 letters. I said vacate the stipulation and order, which was 13 the document that you claim you were misled into entering into. 14 MR. SCHWARTZ: Right, which, I think, has the effect 15 of unwinding at least the letter agreement because the letter agreement has no legal force without your Honor's approval of 16 17 it. 18 THE COURT: Is that correct? 19 MR. SCHWARTZ: I believe that's right. 20 THE COURT: Well, take a look at the letter agreement. 21 Is there a provision in the letter agreement that it's of no 22 force and effect if the stipulation and order is not entered into? 23

MR. SCHWARTZ: I will double check that.

THE COURT: Why don't you do that?

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MR. SCHWARTZ: The whole reason why it was presented to you was because it was necessary.

THE COURT: Why don't you double check?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, this is Paul Stockhausen on behalf of Basler. Could I comment on this issue briefly?

THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: First, thank you for your flexibility in allowing me to appear by phone this morning. I understand that it's unusual, and I very much appreciate the flexibility in allowing me to do so.

First of all, the --

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. Ultimately do you agree that this case will turn on a construction of the original agreement with Theia and its reference to an airworthiness certificate? Do you agree that that is what this is going to turn on?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: It provides that the condition is that they shall have received a valid FAA airworthiness certificate, and you claim, what, that that term is ambiguous or unambiguous?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, I don't think it's ambiguous, but I don't think we even get there.

THE COURT: Well, I just want to get that clear. So your position is, in paragraph 8, condition on delivery, a

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valid FAA airworthiness certificate is not an ambiguous term, right?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Schwartz, what's your position?

MR. SCHWARTZ: A valid FAA airworthiness

certificate --

THE COURT: This is paragraph 8 of the underlying agreement. What's your position on that term as used in the agreement?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I believe, first, that an FAA airworthiness certificate means a standard FAA airworthiness certificate. Second, I believe that it is undisputed that Basler did not obtain standard-type FAA certificates, even today, and at the time it made its representation to you, it had not obtained even experimental-type certificates for all of the planes.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schwartz, that doesn't answer the question. We can agree that your position is that a valid FAA airworthiness certificate means the certificate for normal operations provided for in 21-175(a) of the CFR, Title 14, and we can agree that that hasn't been provided.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct.

THE COURT: Neither of those were my questions.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your question, I thought, was how to understand the contractual term.

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THE COURT: No. 1 2 MR. SCHWARTZ: Tell me again the question. 3 THE COURT: All right. The question I asked was: 4 you contend that the language in VIII "shall have received a valid FAA airworthiness certificate" is ambiguous? 5 6 MR. SCHWARTZ: I think the plain meaning of that 7 language is a standard FAA airworthiness certificate, and if 8 there's any ambiguity, all of the either evidence and canons of 9 construction point to it meaning that. 10 THE COURT: All right. That's nice. Do you contend it's ambiguous? 11 12 MR. SCHWARTZ: I believe it's not ambiguous. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So you and Basler are on the same 14 page, right? Correct? 15 MR. SCHWARTZ: We believe it is ambiguous in different 16 directions. 17 THE COURT: Of course. That's not a very uncommon 18 situation; is it, Mr. Schwartz? 19 MR. SCHWARTZ: Right. It's not uncommon at all. 20 THE COURT: All right. So you both believe it's 21 unambiguous. The significance of that being that it will 22 likely be for a judicial authority to construe that language, 23 correct?

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THE COURT: And does counsel for Basler agree with

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.

that?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: If that becomes an issue between the parties, yes.

THE COURT: All right. And is Mr. Schwartz correct that as we appear today, there have been no FAA standard airworthiness certificates issued for the aircraft?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yes, your Honor. That's the subject of the declaration we filed in our --

THE COURT: I cut you off. Let me hear what you wanted to say, sir.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Thank you, your Honor. I was going to point out two things. One is that the representation we're talking about doesn't actually say what they keep saying it says. I'll read the entire representation in quotes. This is the final sentence of paragraph 8 of Mr. Varkoly's declaration of March 14, 2024.

This is the quote: "With the exception of painting one plane, as the receiver is aware, I believe that Basler has fully performed all of its obligations to date." It doesn't say anything about ready for delivery. It doesn't say anything about full contractual performance. It says "the obligations to date."

And if the Court remembers, the whole point, the whole reason for the motion to compel is that Basler was sitting there having taken things as far as they could take them, and

it was waiting on the others. It was waiting on the FAA to give approval to the STC modifications, and it was waiting on Theia and then FCS and then later on CogniSphere to give them the directions to finalize the aircraft. So it had done everything it could to that point.

There's no representation in there about immediate delivery of the aircraft, much less immediate delivery of the aircraft to a standard-category airworthiness certificate. The fact that there wasn't standard category, there was experimental category, still an airworthiness certificate, wasn't a secret. The fact that we were waiting on the STC modifications wasn't a secret. These were things that are well known.

Here is the second critical point. What CogniSphere here claims it was aggrieved by is having to pay these monies under the letter agreement supposedly believing that they would take immediate delivery of aircraft with standard-category airworthiness certificates. But Mitch Docken, the individual on behalf of CogniSphere who has filed several declarations in support of this motion, spoke to Mr. Varkoly on the 10th of June before they made any payments under the letter agreement, before the Court's order that is being talked about was entered, and Mr. Varkoly specifically confirmed—and this is in Mr. Varkoly's declaration filed with our response brief—confirmed to Mitch Dockens at that time that there were

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no standard-category airworthiness certificates, that they were under experimental category, that the FAA still needed to act to complete the modifications to the STC before they could be delivered with standard-category airworthiness certificates, which Dockens had indicated they want.

So they were in full knowledge of these facts. They didn't rely on any representations. We believe those representations, limited as it was, were completely true anyway. But they cannot claim that they relied on it in making their payment, making the choice to exercise that option, and make payments under the letter agreement. They could have chosen, knowing full well those facts on June 13, three days later when they chose to make that payment, knowing of the facts, they could have instead chosen to allow the aircraft to go to auction, which was already underway, but knowing all the facts, they made their choice.

We don't have to get to a discussion of what the contract means --

THE COURT: Now, tell me again, your witness is who?

The one who says that he communicated to a representative of—I

don't know—LTS? Who did he communicate it to?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Mitch --

THE COURT: Start again, sir.

Excuse me, sir. The court reporter cannot take you down. Start again. And my question, just to be abundantly

clear on this: Who is it who did the talking on behalf of Basler, and to whom did they communicate that no airworthiness certificates, standard ones, had been obtained? And when was this communication?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Sure. That is in the -- just so that the court reporter knows where to find this in the factual record, this is in paragraph 22 of Mr. Varkoly's declaration, which is ECF document 463. The specific answer to the question is: The person speaking on behalf of Basler was Joel Varkoly, the president, and the person hearing the information was Mitch Dockens on behalf of CogniSphere.

THE COURT: And when was the communication?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: June 10, 2024.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Schwartz, do you want to respond to that? You presumably have seen this in the cited paragraph of ECF 463.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Sure. So let me respond to a few things including that. Number one, there's no question we knew before we paid the money that they did not have standard-type certification. We disclosed that to you in our very first letter on July 1. We said we just found this out, but we had really -- we were put in between a rock and a hard place, because if we didn't pay the money, they were permitted to go to auction and sell it --

THE COURT: Well, let's just back this up. You are

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making a claim that you were lied to, or your predecessor in interest was lied to as an inducement to enter into that which became the order of June 11, 2024, correct?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct.

THE COURT: So now I want to find out whether you dispute that this conversation took place on June 10.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know about that specific conversation, but I agree before the money was paid --

THE COURT: I'm asking you before the order was entered. That's what has been claimed here, that it took place on June 10.

MR. SCHWARTZ: It doesn't matter. The important thing is what representations were made before the parties entered into the letter agreement and presented it to your Honor for approval. All of it happened before June 10. So the misrepresentations that were done in connection with contract formation and then to the Court in connection with getting the order, they were already made.

THE COURT: Oh, no, no, no, sir. No, sir

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well --

THE COURT: And if you got in touch with me and I

entered the order, my goodness, I would vacate it if you had a valid basis to claim a misrepresentation.

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's what we did. So we did that on July 1. I appreciate that was not June 10 or June 11.

THE COURT: No, but the argument is before you paid the money, you knew. Before the stipulation was entered as an order of the Court, you knew, and your comeback is a very surprising one. Your comeback is, well, we had signed the letter agreements. And I asked you before whether those letter agreements remain enforceable, and if I understood you correctly, no, they were dependent on there being an order. And if there was no order, those agreements are not valid. Is that your position?

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's true. And I've looked at it, and that's certainly true.

THE COURT: And there's a provision in there to that effect?

MR. SCHWARTZ: There's -- there are things that the letter agreement does that can only be done with Court approval, which was the reason why Court approval for the letter agreement was sought. So the letter agreement cannot be effectuated without Court approval. It required, for example, a lift of the receivership stay for Basler to go forward with an auction under the auction option under the letter agreement.

THE COURT: Well, that was only if there was a failure

1 | to pay.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, but that was the structure of the agreement. I'm saying the structure of the agreement, it was obviously a holistically negotiated agreement, and it could not have been implemented without the Court's approval.

THE COURT: What was the language in the agreement regarding lifting the stay?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm not sure that there's language in the agreement other than specifically language about the resolution of Basler's then pending motion, which was also resolved through the letter agreement, but the stipulation and order --

THE COURT: I know what the stipulation and order says. It says if there's a breach, they can go ahead.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Not a breach. It's not a breach.

THE COURT: A nonpayment.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The structure of the letter agreement was there were several different options, one of which was if there's nonpayment under option one or two, Basler could go to auction. But there was still then option three, where LTS could take it out of the auction process by paying an extra fee, and that's the one that actually happened.

THE COURT: And now what I'm asking you is whether this was in the letter agreement.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't think -- without reading every

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      single word, there's something in the letter agreement that
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      says this agreement requires approval of the Court.
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      crystal clear that that's what the parties believed. Maybe
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     Mr. Michael could speak to that because he was involved in it.
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      But it was crystal clear that just like the sale -- just like
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      the sale of assets was originally an agreement between Brevet
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      and the receiver, the APA, but it was of no legal moment until
      the Court approved it because of the receivership.
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                                                          This, too,
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      was of no moment until the Court approved it. And everyone --
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               THE COURT: And therefore, it becomes critically
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      important to know whether the representation that has been made
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      that is based on, I think I heard paragraph 22 of ECF 463, is
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      accurate and claimed to have taken place on June 10?
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               MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, so --
               THE COURT: I think your client has a note to send
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      you, so why don't you talk to your client?
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               MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm sure he does.
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               (Counsel and client conferred)
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               MR. SCHWARTZ: It is true that money was paid in
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      tranches, and some of the money was paid before June 10 and
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      some of the money was paid after June 10. So to the extent --
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               THE COURT:
                           When was the money before June 10 paid?
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               MR. SCHWARTZ: Late May.
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               THE COURT: Late May. And what did you rely on that
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was false to make that payment?

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MR. SCHWARTZ: Everyone understood, including based on
the representations that they admit in their opposition papers
were made directly to the receiver; they say separate from the
declaration to the Court, they represented to the receiver that
the planes were in deliverable condition. Everyone understood
it. And the entire premise of their original motion for cure
costs was these things are ready for delivery but for the fact
that Theia, and then the receiver, hasn't paid us. And that --
         THE COURT: And so you thought there were FAA
certificates of airworthiness?
        MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct.
        THE COURT: And then I'm told that certainly on
June 10, you knew that wasn't true.
        MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know exactly. That's what --
        THE COURT: Why don't you talk to your client again?
Maybe you can find out.
        MR. SCHWARTZ: He wasn't party to that conversation.
        THE COURT: Okay.
        MR. SCHWARTZ: We found out --
        THE COURT: I'm sure he did his due diligence before
acquiring CogniSphere, no?
        MR. SCHWARTZ: Before acquiring CogniSphere?
         THE COURT: Didn't you tell me he was the owner of
CogniSphere?
        MR. SCHWARTZ:
                       Yes.
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1 THE COURT: Yes, before he acquired CogniSphere. 2 MR. SCHWARTZ: The diligence was understanding the 3 contractual relationships and the value of the assets. We 4 tried to --5 THE COURT: This would relate to the value of assets, 6 right? 7 MR. SCHWARTZ: But we tried to do diligence on the 8 planes themselves, but until the money started flowing, Basler 9 wouldn't permit any of that diligence. That's why we don't 10 find out anything until after the money starts flowing in late 11 May. 12 THE COURT: Well, apparently and --13 MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Can I comment on that topic? 14 THE COURT: -- unless you have something to contradict it with, because you had this before you walked in the 15 16 courtroom today. 17 MR. SCHWARTZ: I agree. I'm okay assuming for 18 purposes of this conversation that on or about June 10, we 19 found out that there was no airworthiness. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. SCHWARTZ: And I understand the position that we 22 should have run into court then, and say this was --23 THE COURT: Yeah, I know you understand it, but what's 24 the legal effect of it? 25 MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't think anything. Because we

made prior to the signing of the letter agreement and to obtain approval of the letter agreement. It is true, assuming this conversation happened on the 10th and it came back to the principals, that we could have run into court, you know, within a day before you signed the order and said, Hold on, that representation is not correct. But we were also being told by Basler that these things were imminent.

That's what we wrote to you on July 1. We said, Look, we're not trying to make a big deal of this, but we were told that these certifications were imminent. They haven't come yet. We want to just let it be known that if they don't come through soon, it's a problem. And your Honor --

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz, you are trying to say it's not a big deal, it's imminent, et cetera, but the reality is you are premising your fraud claim before me on not knowing that there were no FAA standard airworthiness certificates.

That's what you're premising it on. So when you tell me it's not a big deal, it kind of undermines your fraud claim.

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, no. I --

THE COURT: And, yeah, we might have known on June 10. It doesn't sound like you're a victim of a fraud.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm not saying it's not a big deal.

I'm saying our application is premised upon representations
that were made to you and that were made to the receiver that

were false, right, and those --

THE COURT: So stop with this business like it's no biggie that we knew on June 10.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay. But at that point, we were already mid-transaction. Money had flowed, and all of the parties were behaving as if this letter agreement, although it hadn't yet been approved, was going to be approved. So there are deadlines, date deadlines not keyed off of the entry of the order, but objective date deadlines in the letter agreement that had to be dealt with.

So there were on-the-ground realities which is why my client had to make a decision even though it knew prior to making the last payment for sure that these standard-type certifications were in place. Because if it hadn't done that, the planes would have been sold at auction, and they would have been sold on an as-is basis and --

THE COURT: Under paragraph 3 of the order, right?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Under the auction provision of the

19 letter.

THE COURT: That's where your argument falls apart, Mr. Schwartz.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I understand --

THE COURT: That's where your argument falls apart.

Stop. Have a seat.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I --

before me many times. I've been very complimentary about your work before me, but this is now talking nonsense. If you knew, there would have been no paragraph 3. If you had alerted the Court, I certainly would have stopped on a dime before I signed it. I don't know what I would have done, whether I would have ultimately signed it or not, but rest assured that I would have stopped on a dime if you made the assertion, There's a fraud going on here. I just found out. My client just found out. Mitch Dockens just found out that there are no FAA standard certificates of airworthiness. There wouldn't be a paragraph 3 of an order because you have told me today on the record that that language doesn't appear in the letter agreements. So the argument sounds to me like it is full of holes.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I'm not sure what you mean when you say the language doesn't appear in the letter agreement.

THE COURT: Well, I asked you. I asked you the question. I'll ask it again. Maybe you'll give me a different answer. But did the letter agreement contain language about lifting the automatic stay or the stay of any actions? I don't believe so. I believe you told me, No, no, no, the letter agreements didn't say that. That was paragraph 3 of the order.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well --

THE COURT: And you told me the letter agreement absolutely contemplated the order. If there was no order,

there's no letter agreement.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The letter --

THE COURT: Well, then stop the presses on June 10.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Let me say two things. Number one,
Ms. Ruff helpfully points out that in paragraph 2 of the letter
agreement, it does expressly refer to lifting a receivership
stay. For what it's worth, that is in the letter agreement.

THE COURT: Which the letter could not do without the order --

MR. SCHWARTZ: Agreed.

THE COURT: -- and you told me, and I think I'm agreeing with you, the letter was premised on their being an order.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I agree 100 percent.

THE COURT: If that's the case, you could have stopped the train.

MR. SCHWARTZ: So accepting all of that, I think the question is: Does the fact that we tried to be constructive and not run into court and upset all of those negotiations in a contract that was already going through, does that erase the fact that misrepresentations were made? I think the answer is no, and I think your Honor ought to be at least as upset at Basler as you are at me that misrepresentations were made to receiver and to the Court in connection with obtaining that order. And there ought to be consequences for that, and that's

really what we're here for.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask Basler's attorney: Have you been paid what the June 11 order required you to be paid?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Mostly, not completely, your Honor.

THE COURT: What not completely?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: The letter agreement specifically says that after the exercise of whichever option, the payment option or the cancellation option, the cancellation option is what occurred, that the parties acknowledge and agree that to get from there to actual delivery is going to require additional services from Basler in the ordinary course, storage costs, and other costs incidental to the delivery. Those costs have been accruing. They total -- I think Mr. Varkoly put in his declaration that as of November it was right around a little shy of \$400,000, but they continue to accrue every day. So those costs are outstanding and need to be paid, but other than that, your Honor, I think we've been paid everything.

THE COURT: All right. Now, do I understand you that you have some expectation that you will receive standard airworthiness certificates in or about the first week of December?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, for two of the aircraft, yes. The aircraft that is currently at the paint shop can't be looked at by FAA DAR until it comes back from the paint shop, which right now, based on the paint shop's schedule, looks to

be mid-January. For two of the aircraft, first week of December, and for one of the aircraft, mid-January whenever it's back from the paint shop, and we can schedule the DAR.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: I'd like to point something out if I may, your Honor, about this question of notice. You know, we've talked about fraud and misrepresentation, and we still haven't gotten back to any representation to the Court about standard-category airworthiness certificates. If the parties truly talked past each other and had a different understanding of what the term meant in the contract, as your Honor noted in the beginning, that's a different question. That's a contract interpretation question that would have to go before a court in Winnebago County, Wisconsin, to talk about the interpretation of --

THE COURT: Well, it's either going to be there or here, I assume.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: What?

THE COURT: It's either going to be there or here.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yes, your Honor.

And one thing that's really critical is the status of these aircraft; the fact that they were under experimental airworthiness certificates, the fact that the STC modification was applied for but pending FAA action, the fact that in all other ways, they were ready to go, ready for delivery, work on

them had been completed as far as it could be without the final input from Theia or LTS or CogniSphere. That status was the same from 2021 forward. It had been the same all along, and it was not a secret.

LTS before CogniSphere or CogniSphere after that at any time could have found out that information by calling Joe Varkoly at Basler, by emailing, by asking the questions, by coming and visiting, any means. And when they were investigating — LTS was investigating whether they wanted to step into Theia's shoes and buy the Theia receivership assets; could have asked. It was a widely known fact. There was even available public records that would have reflected part of it because it's an ongoing FAA proceeding. Could have asked.

Between then and the pending motion to compel, could have asked. Could have known. Didn't bother all the way up until the moment they were going to make that final payment on the 13th of June. They finally asked, and when they finally asked, they were immediately told and there was no more uncertainty. This isn't reliance on a fraud or a lie. They, for whatever reason, never looked.

THE COURT: Well, this is asked out of total ignorance on the subject. Are FAA standard certificates of airworthiness matters that are knowable by somebody who has the appropriate identification numbers of the aircraft?

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MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yeah. You can go to the FAA's website and look up any aircraft by tail number, and you can obtain its entire registration status, which includes its airworthiness status.

THE COURT: And as of May 1, what would you have found if you looked on May 1? Make that April 15. What would you have found out on April 15 if you had looked up the tail number?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: My understanding, your Honor, is you would have found out the aircraft are registered to Basler Turbo Conversions, and that aircraft 68 -- you know, I can't remember which of the numbers it is. Two of the three aircraft were under currently active experimental category airworthiness certificates. The third wasn't at that time under any airworthiness certificate because that was the one that was waiting to be completed, which now that I say this out loud was aircraft 70.

THE COURT: So if there's discovery in this and depositions are taken, one supposes that we'll find out whether LTS or CogniSphere or its owner did that --

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- before plunking down 12 million bucks.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: It's not a secret. We would have told them this information if they were confused about it at any time.

THE COURT: I understand. I understand.

Mr. Schwartz, can you say that your client—let's take April—did not know as of April what could have been learned by a check of the FAA website?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know. I can ask him. I can put him on the stand to see when we found out what we found out. And in that connection --

THE COURT: No, no. I had a specific question.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I know --

THE COURT: I had a specific question.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I know. I'm answering it. I'm answering it.

THE COURT: So finding out what a particular individual learned and when he learned it doesn't answer the question of whether in the course of due diligence someone on behalf of LTS or CogniSphere, whether it was a lawyer, a retained aircraft broker or otherwise, had secured this information. I mean, I would find it astounding that you would buy an aircraft not knowing anything about the condition of the aircraft, the maintenance, the hours on the engine, any of these things, or whether it had a normal certificate of airworthiness.

Now, it will be great. If I keep this case, we'll have a hearing. We'll have the testimony of the witnesses and we'll have the witnesses—your witnesses—come up and take the

stand and say it never occurred to me to check the FAA website to see whether there was a certificate of airworthiness before plunking down \$12 million. I'd be very curious to hear that testimony.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know the answer to that. I don't even know if we knew the tail numbers at the time. As they note in the papers, these numbers, 68, 69, 70, these are arbitrary designates not tail numbers. I don't know the answer to that. I also -- I may have been reading quickly, but since my friend made the observation, your Honor, that there was some conversation between their president and a representative of CogniSphere on June 10, an important date, I looked carefully at his declaration to find that and I don't see that. I may be overlooking it, but what I see is a representation that between late May and June 13, there were a number of conversations including where that was discussed. That would be important, too.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: That's accurate, your Honor. The specific date of June 10 is, in fact, the date that Mr. Varkoly had the conversation with Mitch Dockens. Getting to the level of talking about which of each of the conversations Mr. Varkoly had during that period wasn't critical at the time we filed that declaration a couple weeks ago. So what seemed critical was that they knew the facts before the date of June 13, which is when they chose to exercise the option and make the payment.

We could certainly have Mr. Varkoly get on the stand or submit a supplemental declaration describing that specific conversation that occurred on the 10th.

I think what the declaration says is that he had multiple conversations with multiple people for LTS between May 31 and June 13 and provided all of the information that I described. He, in fact, did do so. One of those conversations was the conversation on the 10th of June with Mr. Dockens.

THE COURT: All right. Let me get to something of more practical significance. I want to hear from Basler's viewpoint what happens with regard to the two planes in the first week of December. I don't know how this works. Is it like a driver's test where you complete the driver's test and they tell you passed or you failed? Does it take a week? A month? Three months? When do you find out whether you get standard certificates of airworthiness on the two planes?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, my understanding, and I don't have a full detailed understanding of Mr. Varkoly to lay all this out for you, but my understanding of it is what the DAR—it stands for designated airworthiness representative—from the FAA does is -- this is in relation from the application for the modification of the STC. So they are coming out essentially to inspect the aircraft and confirm that the condition of the aircraft is as it was represented to be in the application for the modification of the STC, and they

are confirming that it is so as their confirmation.

They look at it. It's essentially a checked box.

Yep, yep. It is. That's what you said. That's the system

that is installed. That's the one listed on the modifications

from the STC and described in the training materials. And that

upon the DAR's making inspection and confirming that it is as

it was said to be, at that point, they sign off. And then, the

standard-category airworthiness certificate issues from the

type certificate holder, which is standard Arrow in this case,

and that that's simply inputting it on the form on the internet

and it's done. It's not so much a piece of paper as a change

in status of the aircraft. So it's effectively immediate after

the inspection is complete. It should be the same day.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: That's my understanding of it.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. So let me ask your view of the world, and then I'm going to ask CogniSphere its view of the world. Two of the planes now have standard certificates of airworthiness. What happens with regard to those two planes? And then, we'll talk about what happens with regard to the third plane. Start with the two planes. In your view of the world, what should happen?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: What should happen, your Honor, we believe—and this is what we've sort of been following all along—is we're just following the normal course toward and

through delivery under the contract. And there's a specific procedure to follow for delivery that — and there will be — as soon as the parties schedule the moment of delivery, which we've been waiting for to get schedule, then they come out and they do, first, a ground inspection, which is essentially them going through the aircraft in every detail and confirming that it conforms to the agreed specifications for the aircraft. And then, they do a flight, and then sign-off on that. And then, they'll do a flight inspection where they will go up with the instructor and take the aircraft through its paces and demonstrate that in flight, in operation, it conforms to its specifications. And then, there's the pilot transition training that will occur as part of that.

That process will complete with acceptance of the aircraft against the contract specifications, and assuming they accept it, that it is what they understood it was supposed to be, that we would then sign — they would sign the acceptance of the aircraft. We would sign the bill of sale transferring ownership of, you know, title of the aircraft, and then they file with the FAA and get their registration transfer. That's the process under the contract. That's what we see occurring.

We can do it with the aircraft sequentially, you know, the first two and the third one when it's available. We can do them all when they are all available. We can do it in any order that CogniSphere prefers. And I believe that

representatives, in fact the same Mitch Dockens of CogniSphere, have been in touch with Mr. Varkoly to start scheduling all of that already.

THE COURT: All right. So it's not crystal clear to me, but first order of business would be the FAA inspection of the two aircraft. Then there would be some inspection process by the buyer, right?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And then the two aircraft would be eliqible to be delivered to the buyer, right?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yes.

THE COURT: And what's the story on the third aircraft?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: The story on the third aircraft, your Honor, is exactly the same.

THE COURT: I know it's being painted. But when the paint dries, what happens?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: When the paint dries, it gets flown back to Basler's hangar at Oshkosh, Wisconsin, and Basler will do the final, you know, checks and minor assembly post-pointing that is normally done. And then, the same process will occur.

THE COURT: And when will the paint be dry?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: I don't believe we've got a firm date on that, your Honor, but our understanding is mid-January.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Thank you. Let me hear

from Mr. Schwartz, your version of the world. What should happen when, as, and if, there is an issuance of a standard airworthiness certificate in or about the first or second week of December?

MR. SCHWARTZ: So assuming all the contracts in order stay in place and the standard airworthiness certificates are issued, then, as my friend said, as soon as the planes otherwise meet the specifications, they will be ready for delivery. When they go through that sort of delivery process, that will become the delivery date. I appreciate Basler clarified both in their papers, in our meet-and-confer yesterday, and in my friend's remarks just now, that the delivery date hasn't occurred yet and will occur at some point in the future when all those points happen, and then we'll take delivery. The one part of it that was left out was they also have charged us and intend to charge us large sums of money for storing, maintaining and insuring the planes.

THE COURT: And you think I should adjudicate that?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, those are the cure costs.

THE COURT: Do you think I should adjudicate that?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, in the following sense. The incremental monies that were paid in the letter agreement, the cure costs, are those costs. Those are costs that Basler -- this is why the misrepresentation is so important.

THE COURT: You are so far remote from the reason for

this receivership. You're a total downstream party. My analogy to the Ricoh copier warranty is not far off base.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Again, we're not here complaining about contract terms. We're not here complaining about the diligence that was done. The reason why we're before you is because an order was obtained from your Honor and an agreement was obtained from the receiver and LTS based on the representation that the planes were deliverable then. And you just heard an admission that the planes won't be deliverable until sometime next month or the month after that. And that was the basis —

THE COURT: No, no, no, no. That's not what I heard.

No, no. Their position is that—I hear it. I'm not adopting

it. But their position is that they have satisfied the

requirement in the contract of a valid FAA airworthiness

certificate, and they assert that the experimental certificate

under 21-191 is an FAA airworthiness certificate. A point with

which you vigorously disagree. I understand.

MR. SCHWARTZ: And, of course, they agree that one of the planes doesn't have that.

THE COURT: I didn't hear that.

MR. SCHWARTZ: It's in the papers.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, I could explain that point.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: It's true that one of them doesn't have that because that's something we're supposed to provide upon delivery. The experimental-category airworthiness certificate could have been obtained in a moment's notice at any time because the third aircraft is airworthy, but there was no point in applying for it until we had a scheduled delivery date because they expire and we'd just have to do it again. And Basler had already earlier applied for those as to the first two aircraft, and they had them and they expired and they reapplied and it expired. And they just didn't want to start that process unnecessarily with the third aircraft because Theia was in receivership by the time the third aircraft was complete. There was no point in applying for it.

They were planning to apply to comply with the obligations upon delivery as soon as the parties agreed on the delivery date. CogniSphere declined to take delivery of the aircraft with experimental-category airworthiness certificate, and so we're waiting to schedule a delivery date after getting the standard-category ones that they desire. That's why the scheduling is the case, and that's why there's not airworthiness certificate on the third aircraft yet because it hasn't been delivered yet. It was --

THE COURT: Okay. I've heard enough. I've heard enough of that. The fact of the matter though is you say, and I hear you. You are here because your client was defrauded in

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connection with entering into an agreement that was premised on an order to be entered by the Court. You say that. That's why you're here. That's why you're not Ricoh copier. That's why you are different.

Yet, you do not dispute in this proceeding today that a representative of your client or its predecessor in interest knew on June 10 that there were no standard certificates of airworthiness. And I've learned that that circumstance was knowable.

MR. SCHWARTZ: So --

THE COURT: Before that even.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The June 10 --

THE COURT: And therefore, I get back to my question to you: You're fine with taking delivery of these planes in December if they pass your inspection, if the contract is complied with? If there's an FAA standard certificate of airworthiness as to the two and the conditions are otherwise met, you're fine?

MR. SCHWARTZ: If the contracts remain in place, that's what will happen. Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And my strong advice to you today is retain good local counsel in Wisconsin. In which county is it?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Winnebago County, your Honor.

THE COURT: Winnebago. You'll love it there. It's

terrific. All right.

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MR. SCHWARTZ: I --

THE COURT: That's where your future lies.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I understand that there are disputes between the parties that are contractual and that probably belong in that forum. Again, the reason we came here: June 10 was new as of this hearing. And when he said it before, he said it was in the papers, you know, I pride myself on being prepared so I was surprised by that.

THE COURT: I understand. I know.

MR. SCHWARTZ: So I'm not in a position to contest that because I hadn't heard it before. As I said, we've been forthright from day one, however, that before the final payment was made, we knew. But because of the realities, because the transaction was halfway through --

THE COURT: I'm not standing here faulting you for that, for doing what you felt were the economic realities. I don't fault you for that, but you are coming in here claiming fraud.

MR. SCHWARTZ: We're coming in here saying that misrepresentations were made to the receiver, to LTS, and to the Court. And, you know, you've presided over enough fraud cases to know that it's not a defense to say you could have done due diligence and discovered the fraud.

THE COURT: No. But I do know from enough fraud cases

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that it's a fruitful area of intense discovery to find out whether or not there was due diligence done.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Sure. But I'm focused on and our application is focused on --

THE COURT: And whether a rational business person parted with \$12 million without bothering to check the FAA website.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I am focused on and the application is focused on the representations that were made to the Court in connection with Basler's original motion and the stipulation order that resolved that motion. Whatever else happened between the parties, that representation was inaccurate. I understand you are frustrated at this posture, and we're definitely downstream for the reasons that this case was filed in the first instance. But someone came into court and made an application or obtained an order based on a misrepresentation, and I think that matters and I think that belongs here.

THE COURT: And do you ask me to vacate the June 11 order? Would you like me to vacate it right now?

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's the alternative relief we asked for. You have the ability to vacate the order, which will vacate the agreement, which will result, we believe, in Basler having to refund the monies paid by Theia and --

THE COURT: And if they don't?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I would dispute, I guess.

THE COURT: Where?

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's a good question.

THE COURT: Well, I asked it. That's why.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yeah. I don't know the answer to that.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, if I could comment on this misrepresentation issue?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: This is a really critical point.

We're being very fast and loose or CogniSphere's counsel is

being fast and loose with this, you were defrauded, that a

misrepresentation was made to the Court. They conveniently

never go back to what that actual misrepresentation was.

There's nothing in it about the standard-category airworthiness

certificates. There's nothing in about its readiness for

immediate delivery. It always, as part of it, was the

obligation to date. The delivery date was always in the

future, and that was understood by all the parties at the time,

that the aircraft -- the delivery had to have happened pursuant

to the contract.

There's just no representation they can point to the Court that talks about any of the things that they are now claiming are false. They have to pack their understanding of what that would have meant and would have implied in order to get to anything that they can even pretend is a misrepresentation. If we're going to have a fraud case, we've

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got to look at the actual representation we're talking about, and it just doesn't say what they keep saying it says.

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz, you want to -- I'm going to give you an opportunity to say anything you want to say on any of the issues pending.

MR. SCHWARTZ: There are two representations. There's a representation that was made in the declaration filed with the Court that said that Basler had performed all of its obligations under the agreement. The agreement, the contract.

airworthy and with valid FAA airworthiness certificates. The premise of their original motion and of the letter agreement was these planes are ready for delivery but for nonpayment, and so, the letter agreement was a way to remedy the nonpayment. That representation was false because they were not ready for delivery without those airworthiness certificates.

Separately—separately—they admit in their papers that Basler made a representation directly to the receiver that the planes were in deliverable condition, which meant that they had airworthiness certificates. It's undisputed that two of them had only experimental certificates. One had none at all. None of them had standard-type certificates, which is what everyone in the universe understood they meant.

If you look at their declaration, they admit that at the time of contract formation, they only could have been

talking about standard-type certifications because they hadn't yet even started talking about the modifications that led to them ultimately getting experimental-type certificates. No one was thinking of that at the time of contract formation. The representation that was made to the Court and to the receiver were inaccurate.

They obtained court orders that resulted in millions of extra dollars being paid as a result. That ought to be a problem. That ought to be a problem for the Court. That ought to be a problem for the receiver, which is why he put in the declaration, and now it's ultimately my client who was put in a very difficult business situation who bears the brunt of them. So, you know, we're here on that narrow issue, narrow but important issue, seeking relief. And that issue, I think, is properly before this Court. Other issues may be for another court.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further from Basler's counsel?

MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Your Honor, I think we said it all already, and I won't bore you by just repeating things I've already indicated.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to set a conference for January 10, 2025, at 10 a.m. It will be a telephonic conference, and the access number will be as put up in the order of yesterday. I think I put the AT&T access number up

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yesterday. It will be the same number unless you hear
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      otherwise.
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               MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
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               MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Thank you, all, very much.
               (Adjourned)
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